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Beliefs can be correct or incorrect,  and this standard of correctness is  widely 
thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard 
be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist 
understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. 
Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category 
of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons. 
 
 
I 
 
Introduction. I begin with two plausible claims. The first is: 
 
(a)   Belief has a standard of correctness. 
 
That  is,  beliefs  can  be  correct  or  incorrect,  depending  on  whether  they  satisfy  a  certain 
standard. It is very widely held that this standard is truth: the belief that p is correct when p is 
true and incorrect when p is false. Some philosophers have suggested that the standard is not 
truth but knowledge (Smithies 2012). In most of what follows it won’t matter whether the 
standard is truth or knowledge. When that is so I will sometimes talk, for brevity, as though 
the standard is truth. Strictly I mean to be neutral. 
The second plausible claim is: 
 
(b)   Belief’s standard of correctness is fundamental to epistemic normativity. 
 
By ‘fundamental’ I mean that the standard of correctness helps to explain the extensions of 
many (other) epistemic normative properties. For example, it is often thought that a belief is 
epistemically justified when and because it is, in some sense, sufficiently likely to be correct, 
or a sufficiently good attempt at correctness. This is rough, but I hope it makes the general 
idea, which is widespread,
1 clear enough for my purposes. 
The normative property I will focus on is that of being an epistemic reason. So, according to 
(b), a consideration’s being an epistemic reason for a certain belief is explained by some 
relation between that consideration and the putative correctness of the belief. 
In what follows I will assume that (a) and (b) are true. This raises two questions which I want 
to address: 
 
                                                           
1 E.g. Bonjour (1985), Goldman (1999), Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Lynch (2004), Alston (2005), 
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First question:   What is the nature of this standard of correctness? 
 
Second question:     How does it ground epistemic normativity? In particular, how does it 
explain why certain considerations are epistemic reasons for certain 
beliefs? 
 
So, can we say something to characterise the property of correctness that true beliefs have? 
And can we, for example, articulate some principle, linking the standard of correctness for 
belief  to  epistemic  reasons,  that  captures  how  certain  considerations  get  to  be  epistemic 
reasons? 
Good answers to these questions should satisfy the following desiderata: 
 
(D1)  They should cohere with plausible claims in the theory of normativity; 
 
(D2)  They  should  contribute  to  (or  at  least  be  compatible  with)  an  explanation  of  the 
  dominance of evidence among reasons for belief. 
 
What do I mean by ‘dominance’? It is sometimes held that only evidence can give reasons for 
(or against) belief. But that’s controversial. We might retreat to the claim that only evidence 
can  give  epistemic  reasons.  But  that’s  to  say  too  little.  Even  if  only  evidence  can  give 
epistemic reasons, it doesn’t follow that these reasons have any special standing relative to 
other putative reasons (e.g. prudential) for and against belief. But they do seem to have such a 
standing. It seems that believing in the absence of sufficient evidence always makes you 
irrational, or criticisable, in an overall sense. The evidence isn’t just one set of reasons, to 
weigh up against others, and to potentially be outweighed, in reasoning about what to believe. 
You  have  overall  sufficient  reason  to  believe  only  if  you  have,  specifically,  sufficient 
evidential reasons. 
In what follows I will examine two popular accounts of the standard of correctness of belief, 
and find that they do badly by D1 and D2. I will propose and defend a neglected alternative. 
 
 
II 
 
What is Correctness for Belief? The standard of correctness for belief has been understood by 
some philosophers to be a prescriptive norm, to the effect that you may not believe what’s 
false, whereas  you may or ought  to  believe what’s true.
2 Call this  the prescriptive view. 
Others have understood the standard to be a value. These philosophers hold that true belief is 
somehow good, and/or false belief bad.
3 Call this the evaluative view. 
These  views  can  be  understood  in  different  ways.  They  can  be  understood  as  giving  an 
account of what correctness for belief is — of the property that we attribute to beliefs when 
we say they are correct. For example, for a belief to be correct is for it to be the belief you 
                                                           
2 That there is such a prescriptive norm is defended by Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003) and Whiting (2010). 
3 That true belief is valuable is defended by Bonjour (1985), Goldman (1999), Lynch (2004), Alston (2005), 
Sosa (2007), Fassio (2011), McHugh (2012). 3 
 
ought to have, or for it to be a good belief to have. Or, they can be understood as claiming 
that beliefs’ being correct or incorrect is explained by their having a distinct prescriptive or 
evaluative property. For example, what makes it correct to believe the truth is that this is what 
you ought to believe, or what is good to believe. Either way, on these views, when it comes to 
answering the second question, what does the real normative work is some prescriptive or 
evaluative property, and not correctness as such. 
 
 
III 
 
Problems for the Prescriptive View. The prescriptive view’s answer to the first question is 
that the standard of correctness for belief is a prescriptive norm. How does it answer the 
second question? Presumably, by appealing to some principle linking prescriptive norms to 
reasons. For example, we might say that evidence that you ought to do something is a reason 
to do that thing (Kearns and Star 2009). If the truth is what you ought to believe, this would 
explain why evidence for p is a reason to believe p. 
However, this assumes that the standard of correctness for belief is an ought - a requirement 
to believe truths. This is not especially plausible. Many truths are beyond our ken, many are 
uninteresting,  and  there  are  uncountably  more  truths  than  we  could  ever  get  around  to 
believing. We are surely not doing something wrong by failing to believe all these truths. 
Even if the supposed requirement to believe truths was restricted in some way, in order to 
avoid this problem, further problems arise when we consider propositions whose truth-value 
can be changed by our believing them, as with so-called ‘blindspot’ propositions, and self-
fulfilling and self-falsifying beliefs. In certain such cases, a requirement to believe what’s 
true is unsatisfiable (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007; McHugh 2012). 
Fortunately, prescriptive norms can be merely permissive. The most plausible version of the 
prescriptive view holds that the correctness norm is like this: it says that we may believe 
what’s true, and we may not believe what’s false (Whiting 2010). 
This  version  of  the  prescriptive  view  avoids  some  of  the  problems  mentioned  above. 
However, I think it fails D2. I think it fails to explain why evidence for a proposition is a 
reason to believe that proposition at all, and a fortiori fails to explain why such reasons are 
dominant.
4 
On the face of it, something’s being merely permitted — not forbidden — or evidence for 
this, doesn’t seem to be or explain the existence of any positive reason to do this thing. For 
example, you may stir your tea clockwise, but this doesn’t seem to indicate or make it the 
case that you have any reason to do so. 
The defender of the prescriptive view might insist that, appearances notwithstanding, mere 
permissions (or evidence of them) do, at least sometimes, give rise to reasons. In particular, 
they might insist, the permission to believe truths does this. But then more difficulties follow. 
These stem from the point that, if believing the false is forbidden and believing the truth is 
merely permitted, then withholding on (suspending judgment about) the truth must also be 
                                                           
4 The claim that evidence for p is a reason to believe p may need qualification. Perhaps evidence for p must be 
accessible to an agent in order for it to be a reason for her to believe p. I will assume that any such accessibility 
requirement is met in the cases I discuss. I will return to other possible qualifications below. 4 
 
permitted.  If  it  were  not,  then,  of  the  three  available  outright  doxastic  attitudes  to  a 
proposition p, only one would be permitted. But if only one option is permitted, then that 
option is required. So, on pain of collapsing into the implausible view on which belief in 
truths is required, the permissive version of the prescriptive view must allow that withholding 
on truths is permitted. Withholding on truths thus has the same status, with respect to the 
correctness norm so construed, as true belief.
5 
I think this is implausible in itself, since withholding on a truth is not correct in the same way 
that believing it is. But, given (b), it also seems to have the odd consequence that, if evidence 
for p is a reason to believe p, then it is also a reason to withhold on p — a reason in just the 
same sense, and of the same strength.  That’s because, if there is some principle linking 
permission to reasons, such that a norm permitting belief in truths makes evidence for p count 
as a reason to believe p, then, if that norm also permits withholding on truths, that same 
principle will make evidence for p equally count as a reason to withhold on p. 
So, on this view, evidence for p won’t favour believing over withholding. But, intuitively, 
evidence for p is a reason for, specifically, believing p. 
In response, it might be suggested that evidence for p is a reason to believe p only when you 
are aiming to make up your mind about whether p, and that the prescriptive view can explain 
why it is  a reason in these circumstances. To withhold would be to frustrate the aim of 
making  up  your  mind.  So,  perhaps  evidence  for  p  becomes  a  reason  for,  specifically, 
believing p, because it is the only way you can permissibly satisfy your aim. 
This suggestion seems to presuppose that, by adopting the aim of making up your mind about 
whether p, you give yourself a reason to satisfy that aim. That would be surprising: we cannot 
typically give ourselves reasons to do things just by aiming to do them. What’s more, this 
suggestion  faces  a  dilemma.  If  satisfying  the  aim  remains  something  that  it  is  merely 
permissible to do, then the foregoing argument applies: evidence for p doesn’t seem to favour 
permissibly satisfying the aim over permissibly not doing so by withholding. On the other 
hand, if we suppose that, once you have some aim, you ought to satisfy it, then the present 
suggestion amounts to a restricted version of the obligation view, and runs into problems 
previously mentioned. You can, for example, aim to make up your mind about propositions 
that  would  be  false  if  you  believed  them.  On  this  view,  you  thereby  give  yourself 
unsatisfiable requirements. 
So it seems that the prescriptive view cannot plausibly explain why evidence gives reasons 
for belief. On this view, even a conclusive proof of p by itself gives no reason at all to believe 
p. If there are ever positive reasons for believing anything, they must be non-evidential. So it 
looks like this view can’t explain the dominance of evidential reasons; it fails D2. 
The prescriptivist might deny that this is a problem. They might embrace the conclusion that 
evidence for p by itelf never gives or entails any reason to believe p. They might insist that 
you have such a reason only when you have, in addition to the evidence for p, some reason to 
make up your mind about whether p. Sufficient evidence is a necessary condition on having 
sufficient reason to believe, they might claim, even though the evidence by itself is no reason 
to believe.
6 This is not dominance as I characterised it, but it’s similar. 
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What is the character of reasons for belief, on the proposed view? Perhaps they are hybrid, 
both evidential and non-evidential. Alternatively, perhaps evidence is a mere enabler (Dancy 
2004)  for  there  being  a  reason,  the  reason  itself  being  given  by  the  non-evidential 
consideration that favours making up your mind.
7 Either way, it is fair to say that  we have 
here an unorthodox view of reasons for belief.
8 It seems to me contrary to our ordinary way 
of thinking about them. 
This view also implies surprising things about cases in which people hold beliefs based on 
excellent evidence, but on matters about which they in fact have no reason to make up their 
mind. For example, I have no reason to make up my mind about the colour of the car that just 
passed my window, but, having seen it, I now have a belief about this based on impeccable 
evidence. The present suggestion entails that this belief of mine is one for which I have no 
reasons. That seems false. 
Nor is it clear how (something resembling) dominance is explained. On the proposed view, 
non-evidential considerations can be reasons fo r belief, or parts of them. Why, then, can’t 
they give sufficient reason for belief, even in the absence of sufficient evidence? The idea 
might be this: if you lack sufficient evidence, then you lack sufficient reassurance that belief 
is  permissible.  But,  in general,  it’s  not  clear  that  the  absence  of  sufficient  evidence  that 
something is permissible entails that you lack sufficient reason to do it. In a situation where 
you have only limited evidence about which of the available options is permissible — a 
possibility this view must surely allow for — can’t you still have sufficient reason to take one 
of them? 
The prescriptive view also faces problems when it comes to D1. It is highly plausible that 
what you ought and may do are determined by what reasons you have: if you ought to φ, 
that’s because you have most or decisive reason to φ, and if you may φ, that’s because you 
lack most or decisive reason not to φ (Schroeder 2007, Ch. 7).
9 Given this, the prescriptive 
view  implies  that  you  never  have  most  or  decisive  reason  not  to  believe  a  truth.  Since 
evidence can be partial and misleading, this would be a surprising result. 
Secondly, we seem to face an explanatory circularity. We are assuming, by (b), that what 
considerations  are  epistemic  reasons  is  explained  by  a  connection  between  those 
considerations  and  the  standard  of  correctness  for  belief.  On  the  prescriptive  view,  this 
amounts to the claim that evidence gives reasons because you may believe the truth. But, 
given the highly plausible idea just mentioned, this seems backwards: if you may believe the 
truth, that is because your reasons stack up accordingly. 
These points aren’t decisive. It can be insisted that you never have most or decisive reason 
not to believe truths. The claim that what you ought and may do are determined by your 
reasons can be denied. But these are controversial commitments to take on. 
                                                           
7 Couldn’t it be claimed that the evidence is the reason for belief and the non-evidential consideration is the 
mere enabler? I find it hard to see how. The non-evidential consideration is a reason to make up your mind. 
How then, on this view, could it be a mere enabler for something else’s being a reason to make up your mind in 
the way that is permissible? It is part of what favours making up your mind in the permissible way, not just a 
background condition on something else’s favouring this. 
8 See, for example, the Introduction and contributions to Reisner and Steglich-Petersen (2011). 
9 Plausibly, the set of reasons relevant to determining what you ought and may do  is restricted. In particular, 
though evidence gives reasons for belief, the mere existence of conclusive evidence for  p does not make it the 
case that you ought to believe p. See also n. 4. 6 
 
 
 
IV 
 
Problems for the evaluative view. The evaluative view answers the first question by saying 
that  true  belief  is  somehow  good,  and  false  belief  bad.  How  does  it  answer  the  second 
question? It would be natural to appeal to a principle to the effect that, when φing would 
promote  or  instantiate  some  value,  or  when  there  is  evidence  for  this,  there  are  thereby 
reasons  for  φing.  This  would  explain  why  evidence  for  p  is  a  reason  for,  specifically, 
believing p. 
Nonetheless, I think the evaluative view struggles to satisfy D2. There are many ways in 
which a belief might be valuable, regardless of whether it is true. It might make you happy, 
for  example.  So,  unless  the  value  of  true  belief  is  infinite,  it’s  hard  to  see  why  reasons 
explained  by  other  values  couldn’t  compete  against,  and  sometimes  outweigh,  reasons 
explained by the value of truth. 
It might be said that epistemic assessment is uniquely concerned with one fundamental value, 
namely that of true belief, and so reasons explained by other values are irrelevant to it. Maybe 
so. But then we need an explanation of why this kind of assessment dominates the overall 
assessment of belief. 
Perhaps this has something to do with the nature of belief: truth-orientated assessment is 
proper to belief, it might be said, in a way that other sorts of assessment aren’t. Here we 
might invoke the distinction between attributive and predicative good — between goodness 
qua thing of a certain kind and goodness simpliciter. We could then say that truth is what 
makes a belief good qua belief, even if other things can make a belief good in other ways. 
Belief, on this view, is a goodness-fixing kind, comparable to the kind knife. Just as there is 
such a thing as a good knife, and the standard for being a good knife is fixed by the nature of 
knives, so there is such a thing as a good belief, and the standard for being a good belief 
(truth) is fixed by the nature of belief.
10 Epistemic assessment is the assessment of beliefs as 
beliefs, and this is why it dominates the overall assessment of belief. 
While attractive, I don’t think this view satisfies D2. If x is an F, whether x is a good F 
dominates  other  considerations  in  assessing  x  as  an  F.  But  it  need  not  dominate  other 
considerations in assessing x, full-stop; nor in assessing an agent’s choice of x. For example, 
you might have better reasons to get a cheap car than a good one. You need not be irrational 
or criticisable in any way for choosing the cheap one. So it’s not clear, on this view, why you 
should be irrational or criticisable for forming a belief without sufficient evidence, and thus 
one that risks being bad qua belief, if there are strong considerations of some other sort that 
favour doing so — for example, that it would make you happy.
11 
                                                           
10 McHugh (2012). For the notion of a goodness-fixing kind see Thomson (2008). 
11 A suggestion: the goodness of x qua F does dominate other considerations in assessing (the choice of) x, when 
F is the most general relevant goodness-fixing kind. When choosing a car, perhaps the most general goodness-
fixing kind is not car, but something like choice or action. The choice of the cheap car might be good qua 
choice, or qua action. One worry here is that the notion of the generality of a goodness-fixing kind might prove 
hard to spell out in a way that makes the proposed view plausible. A second, related worry is that, when you 
believe something, belief might not be the most general relevant goodness-fixing kind. Perhaps acceptance or 7 
 
So much for D2. What about D1? The evaluative view appears to sit badly with the currently 
popular view that what’s good is what’s correct or fitting to value (Scanlon 1998). Together, 
they would entail that true beliefs are correct because it is correct to value them (qua belief, 
perhaps). While not exactly circular, it seems odd to explain correctness for beliefs in terms 
of correctness for other attitudes. Of course, one might reject the fitting-attitudes account of 
value. But this is not an insignificant commitment.
12 
A second worry here is this: it’s prima facie odd to suppose that something’s being good also 
makes it correct. These seem like very different properties. Pleasure is good, but it’s not 
correct; good knives are not also correct knives. Of course, hedonic qualities and knives don’t 
have standards of correctness, so are not apt to be correct or incorrect. But that just seems to 
support the idea that correctness isn’t a species of goodness. It seems natural to say that if 
true beliefs are good that is because they are correct, rather than the converse. 
This raises a general worry about the motivation for the evaluative view, and indeed of the 
prescriptive view. Why suppose that the standard of correctness for belief must be understood 
in terms of some seemingly distinct evaluative or prescriptive property? Isn’t correctness 
itself the property we are looking for? Perhaps the thought is that correctness is not a distinct 
property  at  all.  Or  perhaps  it  is  that  correctness  is  not  normative,  so  the  standard  of 
correctness for belief needs some other property to give it its normative force. But I think 
these views are mistaken. 
 
 
V 
 
Correctness  as  Fittingness.
13 If  correctness  for  belief  isn’t  explained  or  constituted  by  a 
prescriptive norm or a value, how should we understand it? I propose that it is an instance of 
the familiar property of correctness, or fittingness, for an attitude. I propose that fittingness is 
a distinct normative property in its own right, neither prescriptive nor evaluative. 
Not just belief, but also many other attitudes, can be correct or incorrect, fitting or unfitting. 
When you want a potted plant in your office, admire Mandela, regret a thoughtless remark, or 
fear the onrushing tiger, your attitude can be fitting or unfitting, depending on the features of 
its object. It’s correct, fitting, appropriate or right — these terms can all be used to pick out 
the same property, though they need not always be used in this way — to admire Mandela 
and fear the tiger. It’s incorrect, unfitting, inappropriate or wrong to admire Idi Amin and fear 
the onrushing kitten.
14 
Thus, desire, admiration, regret and fear each set a standard that must be met in order for the 
attitude to be fitting or correct when held towards a given object.  For example, the standard 
of fittingness for admiration specifies the features that a given object must have in order for  
admiration of it to be fitting.   These features make the object   fit  to admire,  worthy of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
propositional attitude is, or mental state, or thing. But I can’t pursue this here. Thanks to Alex Gregory for the 
suggestion. 
12 Way (2013) gives arguments for a fitting-attitudes account of value over a value-first account of reasons. 
13 Many of the ideas I present in this section and the next have been developed in collaboration with Jonathan 
Way. We defend some of them in more detail in McHugh and Way (m.s.). 
14 For the notion of fittingness or correctness applied to such attitudes, see Brenta no (1889/1969), Wiggins 
(1987), Thomson (2008), Chappell (2012). My account here bears some similarities to Thomson’s. 8 
 
admiration, or, as we say, admirable. This standard is, very plausibly, internal to the attitude. 
It is in virtue of what admiration is that the qualities exhibited by Mandela make a person 
admirable whereas those exhibited by Amin do not. 
Similarly, I claim, the attitude of belief sets truth as the standard that a proposition must meet 
in order for it to be a fit object of that attitude — in order for it to be fitting or correct to 
believe the proposition. 
For an attitude to be fitting is for it to have a normative property. But it is not fitting because 
you ought to hold it, or because you may hold it, or because it would be good if you held it. 
Fittingness, I maintain, is distinct from these other normative properties. 
That, in short, is my answer to the first question, namely the question what the nature of the 
standard of correctness for belief is. It might not seem like much of an answer. I have pointed 
to a more general property, of which correctness for belief is, I claim, an instance. I haven’t 
given a reductive account of correctness for belief, or at least not one that will help anyone 
who lacks the notion of fittingness for attitudes in general. But a reductive account isn’t the 
only  way  to  characterise  the  nature  of  a  property.  We  can  point  to  various  constitutive 
features it has, and to connections between it and other properties. I have tried to say a few 
things of this sort about fittingness, and I will say a few more below as I turn to the second 
question: how does correctness for belief explain epistemic reasons? 
 
 
VI 
 
Reasons and Reasoning. My answer to the second question does not follow from my answer 
to the first, but it goes naturally with it. It is this: the standard of correctness for belief can 
explain why evidence for p is a reason to believe p because it is a standard of fittingness, and 
what it is to be a reason is explained in terms of fittingness. I will now sketch an account of 
reasons to fill out this suggestion.
15 
Reasons, plausibly, are closely connected to reason ing. They are the sort of thing that it is 
suitable to reason with. It is natural to think that this is a constitutive truth about reasons. This 
suggests that we can understand reasons as, roughly, premises of good reasoning (Setiya 
2014; Way m.s.; McHugh and Way m.s.). As I will explain later, it is plausible that good 
reasoning can be understood in terms of fittingness. 
Focusing on reasons for belief, then, I propose that 
 
(RR)  For the fact that p to be a reason to believe q is for p to be a premise of a good pattern 
of reasoning leading from fitting responses to the belief that q. 
 
Some clarifications are in order. 
I assume that reasons are facts. I think that everything could be reformulated satisfactorily 
under the assumption that reasons are mental states or contents. But I won’t argue for this. 
                                                           
15 Here I differ from ‘buck-passers’ who explain fittingness in terms of reasons (e.g. Schroeder 2010). Again, 
my claim here has affinities with Thomson (2008), but I do not accept her view that all reasons should be 
understood as reasons for believing. 9 
 
I take reasoning to be a kind of transition between attitudes, or between responses more 
generally.  We  can  call  the  responses  from  which  you  make  the  transition  the  ‘premise-
responses’, and the response to which you make the transition the ‘conclusion-response’.
16 
You might make a transition from the intention to go on holiday, and the belief that in order 
to go on holiday you must buy tickets, to the intention to buy tickets. This is a piece of 
reasoning with an intention and a means-end belief as premise-responses, and an intention to 
take the means as a conclusion-response. 
In the case we’re focusing on, the transition is to a belief, and typically from beliefs. For 
example, you might reason from the belief that the dog didn’t bark, and the belief that the dog 
barks at strangers, to the belief that the dog knew the killer. We can call reasoning to beliefs 
‘theoretical reasoning’. 
By  a  ‘premise’  of  reasoning,  I  mean  the  content  of  a  belief  that  is  among  the  premise-
responses of that reasoning.
17 Above, that the dog didn’t bark, and that it barks at strangers, 
are premises of your reasoning. 
RR is incomplete, in so far as all reasons are reasons for some agent or other, and RR doesn’t 
say what relation the fact that p must stand in to a given agent, in order for it to be a reason 
for  that  agent.  I  won’t  say  much  about  this,  except  to  insist,  first,  that  the  reasoning  in 
question need not be carried out. Patterns of reasoning are abstract. So the suggestion is not 
that all reasons correspond to actual episodes of reasoning. Second, the agent may not need to 
have the beliefs that are the premise-responses of the reasoning. Arguably the fact that p can 
be a reason for you to believe q, even though you do not believe p. 
RR says that reasons are premises of good reasoning from fitting responses — for example, 
from true beliefs. The motivation for this is easy to see. When a piece of reasoning starts 
from a bad place, it won’t correspond to reasons, even if the transition itself is fine. Suppose 
that the dog in fact did bark. In that case, the reasoning described above is still good, but the 
fact that the dog barks at strangers is no reason to believe that the dog knew the killer. 
RR appeals to the notion of good patterns of reasoning. Theoretical reasoning, like other 
reasoning, falls into patterns. Some patterns, like the one corresponding to modus ponens, are 
good. Others, like affirming the consequent, are bad. What is it for a pattern of reasoning to 
be good? It seems that good theoretical reasoning has something to do with getting you from 
true beliefs to  other true beliefs. Roughly put,  good patterns of theoretical  reasoning are 
patterns that are truth-preserving, normally or other things equal. 
True belief is correct, or fitting. Good theoretical reasoning preserves truth. Surely these facts 
have something to do with each other. I suggest that truth-preserving theoretical patterns are 
good because they preserve fittingness.
18 
This generalises to a plausible account of good reasoning as such. The point of reasoning is to 
keep you on track  — to get you from the right sort of starting points to the right sort of 
finishing points. The case of theoretical reasoning strongly suggests that ‘the right sort’ is 
                                                           
16 Reasoning need not conclude in exactly one response; it might conclude in more than one, or in withholding a 
response. I will address the latter case in the next section. 
17 This notion of a premise might need to be extended to include the contents of percept ual experiences or other 
‘seemings’ (McHugh and Way m.s.). 
18 Couldn’t a defender of the prescriptive or evaluative view say that good reasoning preserves permission or 
value rather than fittingness, and take on board the idea that reasons are premises of good reasoning? Yes, but 
my objections to those views, appropriately formulated, would still apply. 10 
 
fitting responses. So, in general, good patterns are those that preserve fittingness. To return to 
a non-theoretical example: if it is fitting to intend to go on holiday, and fitting to believe (i.e. 
true) that, in order to go on holiday, you must buy tickets, then it will also be fitting to intend 
to buy tickets. 
So, using ‘P’ to denote a premise-response, ‘C’ a conclusion-response, and ‘>’ the transition 
between them, we can say that 
 
(GF)  For it to be the case that {P1, …, Pn} > C is a good pattern of reasoning is for it to be 
the case that, normally, when {P1, …, Pn} are fitting, so too is C. 
 
‘Normally’ here stands in for a clause to deal with defeasible reasoning and reasons. The idea 
is that, for example, good inductive or abductive reasoning preserves truth in normal cases. I 
will not try to spell this out here. RR and GF may also require various other refinements 
(McHugh and Way m.s.). I will return to one of them below. My aim here is just to motivate 
and set out the main tenets of an account. 
RR and GF constitute my answer to the question how the standard of correctness for belief 
explains epistemic reasons. This could be extended to other epistemic norms, by appeal to 
principles linking other normative properties to the property of being a reason. In sec. III I 
mentioned such principles for ought and may. 
 
 
VII 
 
Attractions of the Fittingness View. The view I have outlined does well by our two desiderata. 
Regarding  D1,  the  view  understands  epistemic  normativity  as  a  species  of  the  genus  of 
normativity  for  attitudes,  and  fits  into  a  unified  and  plausible  general  picture  of  how 
normative notions like those of reasons, fittingness, ought and value hang together (McHugh 
and Way m.s.). It also refrains from arbitrarily taking correctness for belief to be explained in 
terms of some seemingly different property. 
The view satisfies D2, and does so in an elegant way. It follows from RR and GF that, while 
good evidence for p will be a reason to believe p, practical considerations are not genuine 
reasons for belief at all. From the belief that a reliable measurement showed you to be six 
foot tall, you can make a fittingness-preserving transition to the belief that you are six foot 
tall. So, if the reliable measurement really did show this, then that fact is a reason to believe 
that you are six foot tall. But, from the belief that it would make you feel good to believe that 
you are six foot tall, and the desire to feel good, you cannot make a fittingness-preserving 
transition to having that belief. It may very well be fitting to believe that this belief would 
make you feel good, and to desire to feel good, without its being fitting to believe (i.e. true) 
that you are six foot tall. 
Practical considerations will give reasons for wanting to have certain beliefs, and, perhaps, 
for intending to bring them about. But, on this view, they won’t give reasons for those beliefs. 
These claims are not novel. But it is an advantage of the present account that they fall out of 
it and are given a plausible explanation. D2 is thus satisfied. 11 
 
For reasons of space, I’ll deal with just two objections to the view.
19 
 
 
VIII 
 
Insufficiency of Truth-Preserving Patterns? Consider these two transitions: 
 
(T)  Belief that grass is green  >  Belief that 79 is prime; 
 
(F)  Belief that 77 is prime   >  Belief that grass is blue. 
 
Both of these transitions instantiate truth-preserving patterns. Since it’s necessarily true that 
79 is prime, it’s trivially the case that, normally, if it’s true that grass is green then it’s true 
that 79 is  prime. Since it’s necessarily  false that  77 is prime, it’s trivially the case that, 
normally, if it’s true that 77 is prime then it’s true that grass is blue. But surely the fact that 
grass is green is not a reason to believe that 79 is prime. And surely neither T nor F is good 
reasoning. So there seem to be counterexamples to the account. 
My response to this objection starts from the observation that you cannot perform T or F 
competently,  thereby  adding  the  conclusion-belief  to  your  stock  of  beliefs.  To  reason 
competently, not only must your reasoning instantiate the right sort of pattern — one that 
preserves fittingness — but you must also be appropriately sensitive to this fact. This is a 
familiar point. An agent might make transitions from beliefs in the axioms of arithmetic to 
beliefs in further propositions chosen at random, which happen to be theorems. This agent is 
not reasoning competently. 
The transition in T is truth-preserving just because the conclusion is necessarily true; it has 
nothing to do with the premise. So, in order to be sensitive to the truth-preserving character of 
the transition, you must already be aware that the conclusion is necessarily true. So you can’t 
competently come to believe the conclusion by performing T. 
Similarly, the transition in F is truth-preserving just because the premise is necessarily false; 
it has nothing to do with the conclusion. So, in order to be sensitive to the truth-preserving 
character of the transition, you must already be aware that the premise is necessarily false, 
and thus be sensitive to the fact that the transition (at least) might very well have a false 
conclusion. So you can’t competently come to believe the conclusion by performing F.
20 
This suggests two possible ways of dealing with the objection, which I will not choose 
between. 
We could accept that the fact that grass is green is a reason to believe that 79 is prime, but say 
that this is a useless reason: you cannot competently avail of it in coming to believe that 79 is 
prime. We could claim thereby to explain away intuitions to the effect that it is not a reason at 
all. Similarly, we might say, while T and F count as good reasoning, they are nonetheless 
useless bits of reasoning, since you can’t competently extend your beliefs by performing 
them. 
                                                           
19 For more, see McHugh and Way (m.s.). 
20 Similar points apply to transitions beginning from incompatible combinations of beliefs. 12 
 
Alternatively, we could revise the account of good reasoning: 
 
(GFR)  For it to be the case that {P1, …, Pn} > C is a good pattern of reasoning is for it to be 
the case that you can come to hold C by competent reasoning from {P1, …, Pn}. 
 
Here, competence requires that your reasoning instantiate a fittingness-preserving pattern and 
that you perform it in a way that is sensitive to this. 
 
 
IX 
 
Reasons Not to Believe. You can have reasons not to believe things. Presumably an account 
of epistemic reasons should apply to these. But the account I offered doesn’t obviously do so, 
since it’s not clear that not believing can be fitting or unfitting.
21 
I think the spirit of my account accommodates reasons for not believing, and reasons for not 
doing things in general. The point of reasoning is not only to get you to fitting responses, but 
also to get rid of unfitting ones. But how can this be accommodated within the letter of the 
account? 
Again, I see two broad options here, which I will sketch without choosing between them. 
Both options face prima facie objections, but I will indicate how these might be answered. 
The first option is to say, using ‘C’ to denote not holding C, that 
 
(GN1)  For it to be the case that {P1, …, Pn} > C is a good pattern of reasoning is for it to be 
the case that, normally, when {P1, …, Pn} are fitting, C is unfitting.
22 
 
The  problem  with  this  is  that,  combined  with  RR   suitably  generalised,  it  seems  to 
undergenerate reasons not to believe. In particular, it won’t count weak evidence against p as 
a reason not to believe p. The fact that the forecast said there might be rain is a reason not to 
believe that it will be dry. But it’s not the case that, normally, when the forecast says there 
might be rain, it rains. So the transition from the belief that the forecast said there might be 
rain to not believing that it will be dry won’t satisfy GN1. 
The obvious way to answer this objection is to claim that the standard of fittingness for belief 
is not truth after all, but knowledge. The forecast saying that there might be rain stops you 
knowing that it will be dry, even if it in fact will. So it is not fitting to believe that it will be 
dry. So the transition to not believing that it will be dry satisfies GN1 after all. 
In general, even weak counterevidence normally defeats knowledge. So, this move seems to 
get around the problem of undergeneration. 
                                                           
21 Maybe reasons for not believing are really reasons for withholding belief, and maybe withholding belief can 
be fitting or unfitting. What would be the standard of fittingness for withholding? The obvious candidate is: not 
being in a position to know. If, as seems plausible to me, withholding and belief are never both fitting, it would 
follow that the standard of fittingness for belief is not truth, but, presumably, knowledge. This suggestion might 
thus end up being similar to my ‘first option’ below. 
22 This and the following principle could be reformulated on the model of GFR if necessary. 13 
 
Perhaps it’s too controversial to claim that the standard of fittingness for belief is knowledge. 
Fortunately, there is a second option. We can say that 
 
 (GN2) For it to be the case that {P1, …, Pn} > C is a good pattern of reasoning is for it to be 
the case that {P1, …, Pn} > C is not a good pattern. 
 
This has the opposite problem to GN1: combined with RR, it seems to overgenerate reasons 
not to believe. That’s because, if {P1, …, Pn} has nothing to do with whether C is fitting, 
{P1, …, Pn} > C won’t be a good pattern, but nor, intuitively, will {P1, …, Pn} > C. It’s not 
good reasoning to move from the belief that grass is green to the belief that Hollande is 
president of France. But nor does it seem to be good reasoning to move from the belief that 
grass is green to not believing that Hollande is president. And the fact that grass is green 
doesn’t seem to be a reason not to believe that Hollande is president. It seems irrelevant to it. 
My suggested response to this problem is to bite the bullet and accept that the fact that grass 
is green is a reason not to believe that Hollande is president. This is not as bad as it sounds. 
Firstly, if all the evidence you have available about anything is that grass is green, then, 
presumably, you ought not believe that Hollande is president. Secondly, such reasons will be 
maximally  weak:  they  will  be  outweighed  whenever  you  have  any  reasons  at  all  in  the 
opposite direction. 
To show this, I have to say something about outweighing. Let p be a reason to φ, and q be a 
reason to ψ, where φing and ψing are incompatible. Roughly, p outweighs q when it’s good 
reasoning to move from the belief that p and the belief that q to φing, but it’s not good 
reasoning to move from this combination of beliefs to ψing (Way m.s.). 
Let p be any reason to believe that Hollande is president. So, from the belief that p, perhaps 
together with other true beliefs, you can make a fittingness-preserving transition to the belief 
that Hollande is president. Now, consider the very same bit of reasoning, but with the belief 
that grass is green added to the premise-responses. This will still be fittingness-preserving, 
because  the  truth  of  the  proposition  that  grass  is  green  makes  no  difference  to  whether 
Hollande is president, or to the link between the evidence for his being president and his 
being so — that was what made it seem counterintuitive to suppose that it is a reason not to 
believe. So, this is good reasoning. So, by GN2, it is not good reasoning to move from this 
combination of beliefs to not believing that Hollande is president. Thus, the reason not to 
believe is outweighed by the reason to believe — which was an arbitrary stand-in for any 
such reason. 
So, these intuitively irrelevant reasons not to believe are guaranteed to be defeated by any 
opposing reason.
23 This doesn’t quite make them useless, but it makes it unsurprising that we 
would ignore them and judge them not to be reasons at all.
24 
                                                           
23 As an audience member at the Aristotelian Society pointed out to me, there are reasons for belief that, because 
individually insufficient, will also come out as reasons not to believe, on the present account. For example, p 
might be a reason to believe p&q, given appropriate further evidence. But it’s not good reasoning to move from 
believing p alone to believing p&q. So, given (GN2), and (RR), p is also a reason not to believe p&q. Is this an 
unacceptable consequence? 
If so, perhaps the account could be modified: p is a reason not to φ only when it is not a (non-redundant) 
premise  of  a  good  pattern  of  reasoning  leading  from  fitting  responses  to  φing.  But  I  am  not  sure  it  is 
unacceptable. Firstly, p will be very weak as a reason not to believe p&q, defeated by almost any reason to 14 
 
 
There is plenty more to be said about this and other matters. But I hope to have given some 
initial plausibility to the fittingness view.
25 
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